Pragmatism, Realism, and Scientific Metaphysics
The philosophy of science grapples with fundamental questions about the nature of scientific knowledge and its relationship to reality. A central tension revolves around whether science provides an increasingly accurate depiction of a mind-independent world, a view championed by scientific realists, or whether scientific theories are primarily sophisticated tools for prediction, explanation, and intervention, a perspective central to pragmatism (Chakravartty, 2017; Misak & Talisse, 2021). This divergence becomes particularly pronounced in the philosophy of physics, where theories posit unobservable entities and describe reality in ways that challenge deeply entrenched intuitions. This article explores the historical trajectory and core principles of philosophical pragmatism, contrasts it with scientific realism, examines the influential critique of metaphysics by logical empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, and introduces the more recent development of "sc...