Pragmatism, Realism, and Scientific Metaphysics
The philosophy of science grapples with fundamental questions about the nature of scientific knowledge and its relationship to reality. A central tension revolves around whether science provides an increasingly accurate depiction of a mind-independent world, a view championed by scientific realists, or whether scientific theories are primarily sophisticated tools for prediction, explanation, and intervention, a perspective central to pragmatism (Chakravartty, 2017; Misak & Talisse, 2021).
This divergence becomes particularly pronounced in the philosophy of physics, where theories posit unobservable entities and describe reality in ways that challenge deeply entrenched intuitions. This article explores the historical trajectory and core principles of philosophical pragmatism, contrasts it with scientific realism, examines the influential critique of metaphysics by logical empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle, and introduces the more recent development of "scientific metaphysics" as an attempt to conduct metaphysical inquiry in a manner that is both informed by and responsive to contemporary science.
The implications of these debates are far-reaching, influencing not only how scientific knowledge is valued and how progress is understood but also the very aims we attribute to the scientific endeavor. The philosophy of physics, with its extraordinarily successful yet ontologically perplexing theories like quantum mechanics and relativity, serves as a critical testing ground for these philosophical positions (Chakravartty, 2017; Fine, 1998; Ismael, 2024; Ladyman, 2017).
The Pragmatist Turn: Philosophy as a Guide to Action
Origins and Core Tenets of Classical Pragmatism
Pragmatism emerged in late 19th-century America, with the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge, Massachusetts, serving as a significant intellectual incubator for figures like Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and Chauncey Wright (Fesmire, 2024). These thinkers, later joined by John Dewey, sought to reorient philosophy from abstract, speculative rationalism towards a more experiential, experimental, and practical mode of inquiry.
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), a logician and scientist, is widely regarded as the founder of pragmatism (Burch, 2024; Fesmire, 2024). His central contribution is the Pragmatic Maxim, articulated in his essays "The Fixation of Belief" (1877) and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878). The maxim states: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then the whole of our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object" (as cited in Burch, 2024). This principle ties the meaning of a concept to the sum of its conceivable experiential consequences; if a concept has no possible practical effects, it is considered meaningless (Burch, 2024; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024a; Fesmire, 2024). Peirce viewed inquiry as a process aimed at moving from the discomfort of doubt to a state of stable belief, advocating the scientific method as the most reliable path to achieving such belief (Burch, 2024; Fesmire, 2024). For Peirce, truth is "the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate," or, in a later formulation, "that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief" (Legg & Hookway, 2023). This conception links truth to the long-run outcome of sustained scientific inquiry. Peirce later sought to distinguish his views, which he termed "pragmaticism," from what he perceived as more nominalistic or subjectivist interpretations, particularly those of William James, emphasizing the reality of general concepts and the role of logic (Burch, 2024; Fesmire, 2024). His maxim was intended not to eliminate metaphysics entirely, but to "clear up" metaphysical concepts and make metaphysics itself more scientific (Burch, 2024).
William James (1842–1910), a psychologist and philosopher, was instrumental in popularizing pragmatism (Fesmire, 2024; Goodman, 2024). He presented pragmatism as a method for settling metaphysical disputes by tracing the practical consequences of holding one belief over another. For James, the pragmatist "turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action…" (as cited in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024a; Goodman, 2024). James's pragmatic theory of truth holds that true ideas are those that are useful, that "work," or that help us navigate and make sense of our experience successfully (Goodman, 2024; Legg & Hookway, 2023; James, 1907/1981). He spoke of the "cash value" of an idea in experiential terms (Goodman, 2024; James, 1907/1981). A belief is true, for James, insofar as it is verified by its successful application and leads to satisfactory consequences, "in the long run and on the whole of course" (Goodman, 2024; Legg & Hookway, 2023). This does not mean that any belief one finds useful is thereby true, but rather that the truth of an idea is established through its practical efficacy and coherence with the totality of experience. His controversial "Will to Believe" doctrine argued that in "genuine option" situations—live, forced, and momentous choices where intellectual grounds are insufficient—it is permissible to believe based on passional or practical needs, as such belief can itself contribute to bringing about desired outcomes (Goodman, 2024).
John Dewey (1859–1952) extended pragmatism into a comprehensive philosophy known as instrumentalism (Hildebrand, 2024; Ebsco Research Starters, 2023b). Dewey viewed ideas, concepts, and theories as instruments or tools developed by humans to solve practical problems and adapt to their physical and social environments (Hildebrand, 2024; Ebsco Research Starters, 2023b). Knowledge, in this view, arises not from passive observation but from active interaction, experimentation, and reconstruction of experience (Hildebrand, 2024). Inquiry, for Dewey, begins with a "problematic situation"—a disruption or block to ongoing activity—and proceeds through observation, reflection on possible solutions (hypotheses), and active testing of these hypotheses in experience (Hildebrand, 2024). He applied these ideas extensively to education, advocating for "learning by doing," critical thinking, and democratic classrooms where schools reflect the broader community (Ebsco Research Starters, 2023b; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024a; Hildebrand, 2024). Rather than a static correspondence with reality, Dewey characterized the outcome of successful inquiry as "warranted assertibility," emphasizing the provisional and context-dependent nature of knowledge claims (Hildebrand, 2024).
Classical pragmatism, in its various formulations by Peirce, James, and Dewey, thus represents a significant departure from earlier philosophical traditions. It champions a fallibilistic and dynamic view of knowledge, where truth is not a pre-existing property of propositions that perfectly mirror an independent reality, but rather something that is achieved, tested, and refined through ongoing inquiry and its practical consequences. James's notion that truth "happens to an idea" (Legg & Hookway, 2023) encapsulates this process-oriented understanding. The emphasis on "practical bearings" (Burch, 2024) or "practical difference" (Goodman, 2024) served as an implicit criterion of meaning, aiming to distinguish substantive concepts from empty verbalisms. This focus on experiential consequences foreshadowed later verificationist movements, though, as seen with Peirce, the intent was often to reform and ground metaphysics rather than to eliminate it entirely (Burch, 2024), a crucial distinction when considering the later logical empiricists.
Neopragmatism: Language, Contingency, and Anti-Representationalism
In the latter half of the 20th century, pragmatism experienced a significant revival and reinterpretation, largely through the work of Richard Rorty (1931–2007), a leading figure in what came to be known as "neopragmatism" or "The New Pragmatism" (Malachowski, 2024). Rorty's philosophy is characterized by a profound critique of the Western philosophical tradition's long-standing quest for certainty, foundations, and a "God's-eye view" of reality.
Central to Rorty's neopragmatism is the rejection of representationalism—the idea that the human mind or language functions as a "mirror of nature," accurately reflecting an independent, external world (Malachowski, 2024; Ramberg, 2006). In his influential work, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty argued that the pursuit of a privileged vocabulary or conceptual scheme that perfectly corresponds to "the way things really are" is a misguided holdover from theological modes of thought (Malachowski, 2024; Ramberg, 2006). Instead, Rorty proposed that language should be understood as a set of tools that humans have developed for coping with their environment and coordinating their actions (Malachowski, 2024). Vocabularies, including scientific ones, are contingent historical products, adopted and modified based on their utility in achieving human purposes, rather than for their ability to represent reality with increasing accuracy.
This anti-representationalist stance leads to a distinctive view of truth. Echoing certain aspects of James, Rorty often characterized truth in terms of what is "good for us to believe" or, more precisely, what a particular community, at a particular time, agrees upon as useful for its purposes. He emphasized "solidarity"—the shared understanding and values within a community—over "objectivity"—the supposed correspondence to a non-human reality (Malachowski, 2024). From this perspective, science is one highly valuable set of practices and vocabularies among others, exceptionally useful for prediction, control, and solving certain kinds of problems, but it does not possess a unique claim to revealing ultimate truth (Malachowski, 2024). Philosophy, then, should abandon its traditional role as a foundational discipline that adjudicates knowledge claims. Instead, it should become more akin to a "conversation of mankind," a form of cultural criticism that offers new metaphors, redescriptions, and ways of talking, thereby facilitating social hope and progress (Malachowski, 2024).
Rorty's neopragmatism can be seen as a radicalization of themes present in classical pragmatism, particularly the emphasis on utility found in James and the historicism of Dewey (Malachowski, 2024; Ramberg, 2006). However, it also marks a departure. While classical pragmatists like Peirce and Dewey often sought to make inquiry more scientific and saw science as a privileged mode of accessing truth (for Peirce, an ideal limit of inquiry), Rorty is more skeptical of science's unique epistemic authority, viewing it as one vocabulary among many, albeit a particularly effective one for certain goals (Hildebrand, 2024; Legg & Hookway, 2023; Malachowski, 2024). His anti-representationalism is more thoroughgoing; while classical pragmatists critiqued traditional correspondence theories of truth, Rorty questioned the very idea of representation as a meaningful goal for thought or language (Malachowski, 2024). This shift from a philosophy often allied with scientific methodology to one more critical of science's traditional epistemological pretensions represents a significant evolution within the pragmatist tradition. It also sets up a direct confrontation with scientific realism, for if the goal of language and inquiry is not to represent an independent reality, then the core claims of scientific realism appear to be fundamentally undermined.
Scientific Realism: Science as a Window to the World
Core Commitments of Scientific Realism
Scientific realism stands as a prominent philosophical position concerning the status of scientific knowledge. It is broadly defined as a "positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences" (Chakravartty, 2017). More specifically, scientific realism typically asserts that "well-confirmed scientific theories are approximately true; the entities they postulate do exist; and we have good reason to believe their main tenets" (Liston, 2024). This stance can be unpacked into three interconnected dimensions:
- Metaphysical (or Ontological) Dimension: Scientific realism is committed to the existence of a mind-independent world that scientific investigation aims to describe and explain (Chakravartty, 2017; Liston, 2024). This reality exists objectively, regardless of human thoughts or theories about it.
- Semantic Dimension: Realism maintains that scientific theories are to be interpreted literally. Claims about entities, properties, and processes, whether observable or unobservable, are taken as assertions that possess truth values (i.e., they are true or false) (Chakravartty, 2017). This contrasts sharply with instrumentalist views, which might treat theoretical terms referring to unobservables as mere heuristic devices or fictions (Pressbooks CCC Online, 2024; Instrumentalism, 2023), useful for organizing experience or making predictions but not as genuinely referring to existing entities.
- Epistemological Dimension: Realism holds that our best scientific theories provide genuine knowledge about the world, including its unobservable aspects (Chakravartty, 2017). Science aims to produce theories that are true or, more cautiously, approximately true, and through its methods, it can achieve this aim. This implies that scientific progress often involves an increasing verisimilitude—a growing closeness to the truth about how the world is structured and what it contains.
Arguments for and Variants of Scientific Realism
The most influential argument for scientific realism is the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), often associated with Hilary Putnam (Chakravartty, 2017; Ladyman, 2017; Pigliucci, 2015). The NMA contends that the remarkable predictive and explanatory success of mature scientific theories—especially their ability to make novel predictions that are subsequently confirmed—would be a miracle if these theories were not at least approximately true and if their central theoretical terms did not genuinely refer to unobservable entities that exist in the world. The success of science, from this perspective, is best explained by the assumption that our theories are latching onto real structures and entities.
Another line of argument involves corroboration, where the detection or manipulation of a purported unobservable entity through multiple, independent causal pathways significantly strengthens the belief in its reality (Chakravartty, 2017). If different experimental setups, relying on different theoretical principles, consistently indicate the presence and properties of something like an electron, it becomes increasingly implausible to deny its existence.
Scientific realism is not a monolithic doctrine. In response to powerful anti-realist challenges, such as the pessimistic induction (arguing from the history of falsified past theories) and the underdetermination of theory by evidence (arguing that multiple, empirically equivalent but incompatible theories can exist), various forms of selective realism have emerged (Chakravartty, 2017; Ladyman, 2017). These approaches seek to refine realist commitments by being more selective about which aspects of theories warrant belief.
- Entity realism, associated with figures like Ian Hacking and Nancy Cartwright, emphasizes belief in those unobservable entities with which scientists can causally interact and manipulate in experimental contexts, while remaining potentially agnostic about the literal truth of the overarching theories in which these entities are embedded.
- Structural realism, championed by John Worrall and others, suggests that what is preserved across theory change, and thus what we should be realist about, is not necessarily the nature of unobservable entities but the mathematical or structural relations described by our theories (Chakravartty, 2017; Ladyman, 2017; Fine, 1998). This view attempts to reconcile the historical fact of radical changes in scientific ontology with the intuition that science is making cumulative progress.
These variants demonstrate that scientific realism is an evolving research program, adapting its claims in response to philosophical critique and the historical record of science. The debate over unobservable entities—such as electrons, quarks, fields, and black holes, which are central to modern physics—remains a focal point. The realist assertion that science provides knowledge of these unobservables is a key differentiator from many anti-realist positions, including certain interpretations of pragmatism that may view such entities instrumentally or remain agnostic about their mind-independent existence.
Pragmatism Versus Scientific Realism: A Philosophical Divide
The distinct approaches of pragmatism and scientific realism to understanding science lead to fundamental disagreements concerning the nature of truth, knowledge, the status of scientific theories, and the existence of unobservable entities.
Contrasting Views on Truth and Knowledge
For pragmatists, truth is intimately linked to human practices, utility, and the process of inquiry. Classical pragmatists like Peirce viewed truth as the ideal limit of indefinite inquiry, the opinion fated to be agreed upon by an ideal community of investigators (Legg & Hookway, 2023). James famously characterized true ideas as those that are useful, that "work," or that allow us to navigate experience successfully; truth "happens to an idea" through processes of verification and successful application (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024a; Goodman, 2024; Legg & Hookway, 2023; James, 1907/1981). Dewey preferred the term "warranted assertibility" to describe the outcome of successful inquiry, emphasizing the provisional and functional nature of what we hold to be true (Hildebrand, 2024). Neopragmatists like Rorty further radicalized this by often equating truth with what a particular community finds good to believe or what fosters solidarity, largely abandoning any notion of correspondence to an external reality (Malachowski, 2024).
Scientific realists, in contrast, typically operate with a correspondence theory of truth, or at least aspire to it (Chakravartty, 2017; Liston, 2024). For a realist, a scientific theory or statement is true if it accurately describes or corresponds to a mind-independent reality. While acknowledging that current theories are likely only approximately true and fallible, the aim is to achieve an increasingly accurate representation of the world as it is.
These differing conceptions of truth lead to different views on knowledge. Pragmatists see knowing as inseparable from agency and action; knowledge is instrumental, a capacity for effective problem-solving and adaptation (Hildebrand, 2024; Malachowski, 2024; Misak & Talisse, 2021). For scientific realists, scientific knowledge consists in grasping, at least approximately, the true features of reality, encompassing both its observable and unobservable aspects (Chakravartty, 2017). The pragmatist challenge, particularly in Rorty's formulation, extends beyond merely questioning our ability to know reality (an epistemological issue) to questioning the very coherence of the realist's semantic and metaphysical claims—that theories aim to refer to a mind-independent reality and that such a reality possesses a structure our theories can capture (Chakravartty, 2017; Malachowski, 2024). If language is primarily a tool for coping rather than a medium for representation, the realist project of achieving correspondence seems fundamentally misguided.
The Status of Scientific Theories and Unobservables
The divergence between pragmatism and realism is stark when considering the status of scientific theories and the unobservable entities they posit. Pragmatists, particularly those inclined towards instrumentalism, may view scientific theories as valuable tools or conceptual instruments for organizing experience, making predictions, and guiding action (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024a; Pressbooks CCC Online, 2024; Instrumentalism, 2023). The worth of a theory is judged by its practical success and problem-solving efficacy. Belief in unobservable entities like electrons might be justified on pragmatic grounds: if assuming their existence leads to successful predictions and technological innovations, then the idea "works." However, this does not necessarily entail a commitment to the actual mind-independent existence of electrons as described by the theory; an agnostic or fictionalist stance is also compatible (Fine, 1998; Ladyman, 2017).
Scientific realists, conversely, maintain that successful, mature scientific theories are (at least approximately) true descriptions of reality, including its unobservable components (Chakravartty, 2017; Fine, 1998; Liston, 2024). The unobservable entities and structures posited by these theories—electrons, quarks, gravitational fields—are considered to genuinely exist and to have the properties attributed to them by the theories. For the realist, the predictive power and explanatory success of theories that invoke unobservables provide strong evidence for their existence.
This leads to differing views on scientific progress. For a pragmatist, progress may be understood as the development of increasingly powerful tools for prediction, control, and adaptation, or the refinement of practices that solve more problems more effectively. For a scientific realist, progress consists in achieving theories that are closer to the truth, providing a more accurate and comprehensive account of the underlying structure of the mind-independent world (Fine, 1998; Liston, 2024).
The following table summarizes these key distinctions:
Table 1: Comparison of Pragmatism and Scientific Realism
| Aspect | Pragmatism | Scientific Realism |
| View of Truth | Utility, workability, warranted assertibility, coherence with experience, end of inquiry | Correspondence to mind-independent reality, approximate truth |
| Nature of Knowledge | Instrumental, tool for action/problem-solving, inseparable from agency | Represents (approximate) truth about observable and unobservable reality |
| Status of Scientific Theories | Instruments for prediction and control; judged by usefulness | (Approximately) true descriptions of the world |
| Status of Unobservables | Belief often instrumental or agnostic; judged by practical consequences of belief | Exist if posited by best theories; science provides knowledge of them |
| Aim of Science | Effective action, problem-solving, prediction, control | True (or approximately true) account of the world |
| Scientific Progress | Increased problem-solving capacity, refined tools for action | Convergence towards a truer description of reality |
In the philosophy of physics, these differences are sharply illuminated. The interpretation of quantum mechanics, for example, often forces a choice. Does the wave function represent a real, physical state of a system (a typically realist stance), or is it primarily a mathematical tool for calculating the probabilities of measurement outcomes (a view more amenable to pragmatism or instrumentalism)? (Ismael, 2024; Pigliucci, 2015; Interpretations of quantum mechanics, 2024). Recent "epistemic-pragmatist interpretations" of quantum mechanics explicitly deny an ontological nature to quantum states, suggesting they represent an agent's knowledge or beliefs concerning a system, and advocate for a "participatory realism" where reality is shaped by interactions and is inherently perspectival (Barzegar & Oriti, 2022). This demonstrates how deeply philosophical commitments influence the interpretation of even our most fundamental physical theories.
The Critique of Metaphysics: The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism
The early 20th century witnessed a powerful critique of traditional metaphysics, spearheaded by the logical empiricist movement, most notably the Vienna Circle. This critique significantly reshaped the philosophical landscape and had lasting implications for the realism debate.
The Rise of Logical Empiricism and the Vienna Circle
The Vienna Circle emerged in the 1920s, centered around the University of Vienna and led by Moritz Schlick. Its members included prominent philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians such as Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, and Kurt Gödel (Dunne, 2023; Ebsco Research Starters, 2023a; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024b; Uebel, 2016). The Circle was deeply influenced by earlier empiricists like Ernst Mach, as well as by the logical work of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, particularly his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Dunne, 2023; Uebel, 2016). A primary aim of the Vienna Circle was to make philosophy scientific, to purge it of what they considered to be meaningless metaphysical speculation, and to promote a unified conception of science (Dunne, 2023; Ebsco Research Starters, 2023a; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024b).
Central to their project was the verifiability principle of meaning (also known as the verification criterion of cognitive significance). According to this principle, a statement is cognitively meaningful if and only if it is either analytic (true by definition, like "all bachelors are unmarried") or empirically verifiable, at least in principle (Dunne, 2023; Ebsco Research Starters, 2023a; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024b; Uebel, 2016). Statements that failed to meet this criterion—including most traditional metaphysical assertions, as well as many ethical and aesthetic judgments—were dismissed not merely as false, but as meaningless pseudo-statements, devoid of cognitive content. This was a radical departure from previous critiques of metaphysics, which might have argued against specific metaphysical doctrines on grounds of their falsity or lack of evidence; the logical empiricists aimed to show that such doctrines often failed even to make sense.
The verifiability principle itself underwent considerable refinement. Initial strong versions requiring conclusive verifiability proved too restrictive, famously struggling to account for the meaningfulness of universal scientific laws (which cannot be conclusively verified by any finite number of observations) and statements involving dispositional terms (e.g., "soluble") (Ebsco Research Starters, 2023a; Uebel, 2016). This led to a "liberalization of empiricism," with the criterion evolving towards confirmability, requiring only that a statement be capable of being rendered more or less probable by empirical evidence (Uebel, 2016). Despite these modifications, the core anti-metaphysical thrust remained. The rise of modern physics, particularly Einstein's theories of relativity, played a crucial role in shaping the Vienna Circle's outlook. The overthrow of seemingly self-evident Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time demonstrated that even the most fundamental assumptions about reality were subject to empirical revision, thereby undermining the claims of a priori metaphysics and bolstering the empiricist conviction that all synthetic knowledge derives from experience (Ebsco Research Starters, 2023a; Uebel, 2016).
Rudolf Carnap and the Elimination of Metaphysics
Rudolf Carnap was a leading architect of the logical empiricist critique of metaphysics. In his seminal essay "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language" (1932/1959), Carnap argued that metaphysical statements are pseudo-statements because they transgress the limits of meaningful language. He identified two primary ways in which this occurs:
- A statement may contain a word that is erroneously believed to have meaning. For a word to be meaningful, Carnap argued, its criterion of application must be specifiable, ultimately in empirical terms. Many metaphysical terms (e.g., "the Absolute," "the Nothing," "entelechy") lack such criteria and are therefore meaningless (Carnap, 1932/1959).
- The constituent words of a statement may be individually meaningful, but they are combined in a way that violates logical syntax, resulting in a meaningless sequence. Carnap famously used sentences from Heidegger, such as "Das Nichts nichtet" ("The Nothing nothings"), as examples of such syntactical misuse leading to pseudo-propositions (Carnap, 1932/1959; Gabriel, 2024).
For Carnap, statements like Thales's "The Principle of the world is Water" are meaningless because no empirical observations or tests could, even in principle, confirm or disconfirm them (Carnap, 1934). Such statements, he contended, do not assert anything about the world but rather express an emotional or volitional attitude towards life (an "Ausdruck des Lebensgefühls"). The legitimate task of philosophy, according to Carnap and the Vienna Circle, was not to construct grand metaphysical systems but to engage in the logical analysis of language, particularly the language of science, to clarify concepts, expose pseudo-problems, and foster the unity of scientific knowledge (Dunne, 2023; Uebel, 2016). Carnap's later work, particularly "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950), further developed these ideas by distinguishing between "internal questions," which are asked within a given linguistic framework and can be answered empirically or logically, and "external questions," which concern the existence or reality of the framework itself (Carnap, 1950; Chakravartty, 2017). Questions about "the reality of the physical world as a whole," for instance, were deemed external questions and thus pseudo-questions if interpreted as factual inquiries; the choice of a linguistic framework (e.g., one that includes terms for physical objects) was seen as a practical decision, not a theoretical one about an independent reality (Carnap, 1950; Carnap, 1934).
While the logical empiricists' strict verificationism and their project of reducing all meaningful statements to an observational basis faced significant internal and external criticisms (leading to its eventual decline as a dominant movement), their rigorous analysis of scientific language, their distinction between observational and theoretical terms, and their critique of speculative metaphysics had a profound and lasting impact (Ebsco Research Starters, 2023a; Fuhrmann, 2024; Uebel, 2016; Instrumentalism, 2023). Ironically, the very difficulties they encountered in trying to formalize the meaning criterion and to account for theoretical terms in science highlighted the complexities of scientific language and confirmation (Fuhrmann, 2024; Instrumentalism, 2023), thereby setting the stage for more nuanced discussions within the philosophy of science concerning realism, anti-realism, and the interpretation of scientific theories—issues that would be taken up by the emerging field of scientific metaphysics.
Scientific Metaphysics: Re-evaluating Metaphysics in Light of Science
The strong anti-metaphysical stance of logical positivism, while influential, eventually gave way to new approaches that sought to re-engage with metaphysical questions, albeit in a manner profoundly shaped by the successes and conceptual frameworks of modern science. This has led to the emergence of what is variously termed "scientific metaphysics," "naturalized metaphysics," or "metaphysics of science."
The Perceived Need for a New Approach to Metaphysics
The strictures of logical positivism, particularly its verifiability criterion of meaning, came to be seen by many philosophers as overly restrictive. While effective in critiquing purely speculative or empirically untethered metaphysics, these criteria seemed to risk excluding legitimate explanatory components of science itself, as well as philosophical questions that naturally arise from scientific theories and discoveries (Schrenk, 2024). Issues concerning the nature of physical laws, the direction of causation, the fundamental properties of space and time, the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the relationship between different levels of reality (e.g., microphysics and macrophysics) persistently resurfaced (Ladyman, 2017; Ross et al., 2013; Schrenk, 2024; University of Minnesota Press, 2023). These questions seemed to demand more than just empirical observation or logical syntax; they involved ontological commitments and inquiries into the fundamental structure of the world as revealed by science.
Defining Scientific Metaphysics
Scientific metaphysics represents a broad philosophical orientation that views metaphysical inquiry as being continuous with, significantly informed by, or directly grounded in the findings, methods, and conceptual structures of the empirical sciences, especially physics (Bryant, 2024; Ross et al., 2013; Schrenk, 2024; University of Minnesota Press, 2023; Metaphysics, 2023). A core tenet of this approach is the rejection of "first philosophy"—the traditional idea that metaphysics can establish a priori foundations for knowledge or reality, independent of or prior to scientific investigation (Papineau, 2024; Ross et al., 2013). Instead, scientific metaphysics aims to develop metaphysical theses that are empirically responsible, constrained by scientific evidence, and often directly motivated by puzzles and concepts emerging from scientific practice. It seeks to understand "what the world is like," not merely how scientists conceptualize it, but does so by taking scientific conceptualizations and empirical findings as primary data (Ross et al., 2013; Schrenk, 2024).
Typical topics within scientific metaphysics include the nature of laws, causation, dispositions, natural kinds, space, time, emergence, reduction, and grounding, all examined through the lens of contemporary scientific theories (Ross et al., 2013; Schrenk, 2024). This approach endeavors to articulate a coherent worldview that integrates the diverse insights of the sciences, often with a focus on fundamental physics as providing the most basic categories of existence.
Scientific Metaphysics and the Realism Debate
Many, though not all, proponents of scientific metaphysics adopt some form of scientific realism (Bryant, 2024; Schrenk, 2024). They operate under the assumption that our best scientific theories provide reliable, albeit fallible and incomplete, access to the fundamental nature of reality, including its unobservable aspects. The project then becomes one of articulating the ontological implications of these theories.
One prominent example is Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), which argues that what science reveals as real is not so much the intrinsic nature of individual objects or entities, but rather the underlying structure of relations, often expressed mathematically, that these entities instantiate (Chakravartty, 2017; Fine, 1998; Ladyman, 2017). Proponents like James Ladyman suggest that OSR can better accommodate the history of scientific theory change—where ontologies of objects may be discarded, but mathematical structures are often preserved or subsumed in successor theories—while still maintaining a realist commitment to science tracking objective reality (Ladyman, 2017; Ross et al., 2013).
However, the connection between scientific metaphysics and scientific realism is not monolithic. Some philosophers are exploring how scientifically informed metaphysical inquiry might proceed even from a more pragmatist or anti-realist standpoint. For instance, Hasok Chang has developed an "activist realism," inspired by pragmatism, which redefines realism not as correspondence to an ultimate, mind-independent reality, but as a commitment to actively improving our knowledge of various "realities" through "operational coherence" in epistemic activities (Chang, 2022; Chang, 2023). This approach emphasizes the dynamic and practice-oriented nature of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, some argue that naturalized metaphysics can offer valuable pragmatic or epistemic payoffs, such as unifying scientific theories or enhancing their explanatory scope, even if one does not subscribe to the literal truth of the scientific theories themselves (Bryant, 2024).
The interpretation of quantum mechanics provides a fertile ground for scientific metaphysics. Debates around "wave function realism"—the view that the quantum wave function represents a genuinely real physical field, possibly in a high-dimensional space—versus instrumentalist or epistemic views of the wave function directly engage deep metaphysical questions about the nature of physical reality, driven by the formalism of our best physical theory (Ismael, 2024; Ney, 2024; Pigliucci, 2015).
Scientific metaphysics thus represents a partial rehabilitation of metaphysical inquiry after the sweeping critiques of the mid-20th century. It is, however, a metaphysics transformed, one that seeks to be scientifically responsible and often scientifically driven, rather than returning to purely a priori speculation. It acknowledges the profound impact of scientific discovery on our understanding of reality and attempts to build metaphysical frameworks that are consistent with, and illuminated by, that understanding.
Conclusion: Ongoing Dialogues in Philosophy of Science and Physics
The philosophical exploration of science, reality, and knowledge reveals a complex and evolving landscape of ideas. Classical pragmatism, originating with Peirce, James, and Dewey, shifted philosophical focus towards practical consequences, experience, and the role of inquiry in shaping belief and meaning (Burch, 2024; Goodman, 2024; Hildebrand, 2024; Misak & Talisse, 2021). Neopragmatism, particularly through Richard Rorty, further challenged traditional epistemology with its anti-representationalist stance, viewing language as a tool for coping rather than a mirror of reality (Malachowski, 2024; Ramberg, 2006).
In contrast, scientific realism maintains a robust confidence in the capacity of science to achieve (approximate) truth about a mind-independent world, including its unobservable structures and entities (Chakravartty, 2017; Liston, 2024). This position, while intuitively appealing to many, has faced persistent challenges, leading to more nuanced variants like structural and entity realism.
The Vienna Circle and logical empiricists like Rudolf Carnap mounted a formidable critique of traditional metaphysics, wielding the verifiability principle to declare many metaphysical assertions not merely false but cognitively meaningless (Carnap, 1932/1959; Ebsco Research Starters, 2023a; Uebel, 2016). While the specific tenets of logical positivism eventually lost favor, its emphasis on logical clarity and empirical grounding left an indelible mark on philosophy.
Out of these historical dialogues, scientific metaphysics has emerged as a contemporary endeavor to address fundamental questions about reality in a way that is deeply informed by and often continuous with scientific inquiry itself (Ross et al., 2013; Schrenk, 2024). This approach seeks to move beyond purely a priori speculation, grounding metaphysical claims in the discoveries and conceptual frameworks of modern science, particularly physics. However, the relationship between scientific metaphysics and scientific realism remains a subject of active debate, with some seeing it as the natural articulation of a realist worldview, while others explore its potential from pragmatist or even anti-realist perspectives (Bryant, 2024; Chang, 2022).
The dialogue between pragmatism, realism, and various stances on metaphysics is far from over; it is a dynamic interplay where critiques from one perspective often spur innovation and refinement in others. The interpretation of quantum mechanics, for instance, continues to be a vibrant arena where these philosophical commitments directly shape scientific and metascientific discourse, demonstrating the enduring relevance of these debates (Barzegar & Oriti, 2022; Ismael, 2024; Pigliucci, 2015; Interpretations of quantum mechanics, 2024). The success or failure of scientific metaphysics in providing coherent and compelling accounts of the reality described by fundamental physics will undoubtedly continue to influence the broader philosophical contest between realist aspirations and pragmatist cautions. Ultimately, these philosophical discussions, while abstract, carry implications for how scientific knowledge is pursued, interpreted, and valued within both the scientific community and society at large.
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