The Limits of Agent Control: Why Philip Pettit's Reconceptualisation of Agent Control Fails to Block Strong Metaphysical Determinism
Executive Summary
I will briefly critically examine Philip Pettit's influential account of agent control, particularly as articulated in "Neuroscience and Agent Control," in the context of contemporary neuroscientific discoveries and the philosophical implications of strong metaphysical determinism. While Pettit's framework offers a sophisticated compatibilist reinterpretation of human agency, aiming to reconcile it with empirical brain research, this analysis concludes that it ultimately fails to guarantee free will in a manner that genuinely blocks the implications of strong metaphysical determinism. I suggest that from a naturalistic perspective (the only perspective I endorse, with some caveats for sensible liberal naturalism and pragmatism) all brain processes—including complex cognitive appraisals involving executive functions and the prefrontal cortex—are fundamentally physically realized information processes (See Preliminary Remarks below). These events are causally determined by the prior total set of contributing microphysical information states of microphysical processes within the brain and its environment. This pervasive causal chain, coupled with the temporal precedence of unconscious brain activity (as evidenced by Libet's Readiness Potential) over conscious intention, demonstrates that Pettit's conception of "control" describes a determined manifestation, rather than an uncaused origin, thereby offering no true impediment to strong metaphysical determinism, and consequently no necessary preservation of free will.
Preliminary Remarks
Before proceeding, some cautions and clarification. Using the term 'information process' (and the alternative term 'informational process') is problematic, since it can be variously construed as vacuous, tautological, vague, and incoherent.
As a philosopher and philosopher of psychology and of science, I tend to defer to the best and most influential scientific theories for definitions and conceptions. The prevailing and important conception of information generation, processing, encoding, decoding, and transmission is that of Claude E. Shannon's 1948 research article A Mathematical Theory of Communication. According to that theory, an information source is a either a continuous, or else a discrete, stochastic (able to be modelled statistically) physical process. Shannon's measure of information is a measure of the objective reduction in (frequentist) statistical uncertainty at the receiver-destination about the state of the source.
An interesting and salient adjunct note is that some James Ladyman and Don Ross have proposed a physicalist-frequentist conception of probabilities. Researching this is left to the reader. However, I mention it here because it's one way of keeping everything in the informational world convincingly physical. (I acknowledge the problem of what it even means for something to b physical, but defer to an adaptation of Ian Hacking's 'spray stuff' move: if X can interact causally with a quantum field per QFT then X is physical.)
It's long been observed that this 'hard science first' approach doesn't solve all of the salient conceptual problems. For example, there is an equally important conception of information based upon the program complexity measure of Andre Kolmogorov. That measure of information is based upon the length of the minimal program/description for producing/generating a given piece of data. However, Kolmogorov's concept is more abstract, and doesn't apply directly to physical processes except inasmuch as such a process - in Shannon's theory - can produce a series of discrete symbols or data.
Now, Shannon was an applied mathematician, not a philosopher or a metaphysician. So it is understandable that there are some problems with his concepts. The most impactful confusion is one which had no deleterious impact on Shannon's practical objectives: he often conflates the concept of information (which is also a form of entropy in a physical process or source) with the quantitative measure of information he presents. It's clear, however, that even Shannon could not have thought these two things were the same. His measure of information is a number representing the aforementioned objective reduction in objective, frequentist statistical uncertainty at the destination about the source. The information is what that measure is intended to measure. Or, if that's too confusing, then it's Shannon's version of entropy at the source which is being measured.
For the purposes of this article, I will regard information as something realised by and inhering in physical stochastic processes (per Shannon) or - at minimum - physical structures (per Kolmogorov and - indirectly - Shannon.)
1. Introduction: The Free Will Problem in the Age of Neuroscience
The enduring philosophical debate surrounding free will has gained renewed urgency and complexity with advancements in neuroscience. At its core, this debate grapples with the tension between our deeply ingrained subjective experience of making autonomous choices and the scientific proposition that all events, including human actions, are causally determined.
1.1 Defining the Contours: Free Will, Determinism, and Agency
Free will, a concept inextricably linked to notions of moral responsibility, praise, and culpability, is traditionally understood as the capacity for an agent to genuinely choose between different possible courses of action. This implies an ability to have acted otherwise, even if all antecedent conditions were precisely the same (Startup, 2021). The philosophical landscape is broadly divided into two opposing camps: incompatibilism, which asserts that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive, and compatibilism, which seeks to reconcile them (Allan, 2012; Startup, 2021).
Central to this discussion is the concept of Strong Metaphysical Determinism (SMD). SMD is the metaphysical thesis that the entire history of the universe, from its very inception, is immutably fixed according to a precise physico-mathematical scheme. According to this view, every event, including all human decisions and actions, is the necessary and inevitable consequence of prior physical processes and states and immutable natural laws (Chen, 2020a; Penrose, 1989; Startup, 2021). This implies that, given the state of the universe at any one moment, its state at any subsequent moment is completely determined (all the way from physical macrostates down to the total physical microstates), leaving no room for any alternative possible future (Chen, 2020a; Penrose, 1989). The problem of free will, therefore, is to reconcile our intuitive sense of self-determination with this pervasive physically, causally determined necessity. If all actions are causally necessitated by antecedent microphysical conditions, the question arises as to how agents can be considered truly free or morally accountable.
The understanding of strong determinism establishes a foundational challenge to traditional notions of free will. If every microphysical state at time T leads inevitably to a specific microphysical state at T+1, then the entire trajectory of the universe, encompassing all brain processes, states, and mental events, is predetermined from its earliest moments. This means that any perceived "choice" or "decision" is merely an unfolding of this predetermined chain, rather than an independent origination.
You thought you made a decision, but you were always going to make that decision due to the prior information content of all of the microphysical states and processes in your physical brain and the physical systems and situations in which it is embedded.
This ontological reality directly challenges any definition of free will that requires genuine alternative possibilities or an uncaused cause, setting a high bar for any philosophical account that attempts to preserve free will within a naturalistic framework.
Table 1: Key Concepts in the Free Will & Determinism Debate
| Concept | Definition | Relevance to Report |
| Free Will (Traditional/Libertarian) | The capacity of an agent to choose between genuinely open alternatives, implying an uncaused cause of action or the ability to have done otherwise in the exact same situation (Startup, 2021). | The concept that strong metaphysical determinism fundamentally challenges, and what Pettit attempts to redefine for compatibility. |
| Strong Metaphysical Determinism | The metaphysical thesis that the entire history of the universe, including all events and human actions, is fixed and necessarily determined by prior states and immutable natural laws, allowing for only one possible future (Chen, 2020a; Penrose, 1989; Startup, 2021). | The central philosophical challenge that the report argues Pettit's account fails to block. |
| Compatibilism | The philosophical position that free will and determinism are mutually compatible. Compatibilists often achieve this by redefining free will (e.g., as freedom from coercion, or as responsiveness to reasons) (Allan, 2012; Startup, 2021). | Philip Pettit's philosophical stance and the framework he employs. |
| Incompatibilism | The philosophical position that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive. This encompasses libertarianism (free will exists, therefore determinism is false) and hard determinism (determinism is true, therefore free will does not exist) (Allan, 2012; Startup, 2021). | The opposing view to compatibilism, representing the direct challenge to free will posed by determinism. |
| Agent Control (Pettit's View) | A sophisticated form of control characterized by reasons-responsiveness (actions are appropriately related to beliefs/desires) and "virtual control" (reason monitors automatic decisions and intervenes when necessary), not necessarily requiring prior conscious awareness or an instantaneous "act of will" (Pettit, 2007; Pettit et al., 2016). | The central concept of Pettit's argument that the report critically analyzes for its limitations against strong determinism. |
| Readiness Potential (RP) | A measurable electrical signal in the brain (Bereitschaftspotential) that consistently precedes the conscious awareness of an intention to act (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006; Soon et al., 2008). | Key neuroscientific empirical evidence that challenges traditional notions of conscious initiation of action, forming a cornerstone of the determinist argument. |
| Causal Closure of the Physical | The fundamental principle in physicalism asserting that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause within the physical domain, implying that causal chains do not exit or enter the physical realm from a non-physical one (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Wulf & Isham, 2025). | A critical premise underpinning the argument for the deterministic nature of all brain processes, including cognitive functions. |
1.2 Philip Pettit's Contribution to the Debate: Agent Control
Philip Pettit, particularly in his seminal work "Neuroscience and Agent Control," has made significant contributions to the free will debate by attempting to reconcile human agency and moral responsibility with modern neuroscientific findings (Pettit, 2007; Pettit et al., 2016). His work is a sophisticated effort to articulate a concept of agent control that remains meaningful even in light of scientific discoveries about the brain's operations that challenge traditional notions of conscious will. Pettit's approach involves a deliberate departure from what he terms the "act-of-will" picture, which traditionally portrays conscious will as an instantaneous, pure, and direct initiator of action, distinct from the actions it prompts (Pettit, 2007). This conceptual adjustment is a crucial element of his compatibilist project, seeking to bridge the gap between subjective experience and objective scientific observation.
1.3 The Naturalistic Lens
The analysis presented in this report is critically informed by my own naturalistic philosophy. My perspective strongly asserts that human beings, despite their remarkable cognitive complexity and diverse talents, are fundamentally integral to the natural world and do not transcend its causal laws and explanations in their behavior (Long, 2023a; Long, 2023b). I view such a notion of free will, implying an "indeterminable source" of action, as ultimately inadequate to establish the reality of free will (Long, 2023a). My view consistently reinforces the idea that humans are - possibly and probably - "fully caused" entities, not "causal exceptions to nature" (Long, 2023b).
This naturalistic framework establishes a fundamental criterion against which Pettit's compatibilist account of agency will be evaluated. If nature is causally closed and deterministic, then any apparent "free will" must either be an illusion or a redefinition that is fully compatible with this underlying causal reality. My perspective, therefore, provides the critical philosophical foundation for this article, asserting that any viable account of human agency must ultimately be grounded in and consistent with a causally determined physical universe, thereby setting a strict boundary for what can be considered "free will."
1.4 Report Thesis: Why Pettit's Account Falls Short
This report argues that while Philip Pettit offers a sophisticated compatibilist account of agent control, it ultimately does not guarantee free will in a sense that fundamentally blocks strong metaphysical determinism. Instead, it describes a form of agency that is compatible with, and indeed emergent from, a fully determined physical system. The analysis will demonstrate how Pettit's redefined control, even at the cognitive level, remains subject to the pervasive causal chain of microphysical processes and states, thereby failing to introduce genuine indeterminism or contra-causal power into the system. Basically stated, Pettit's appraisal mechanism - involving "reasons-responsiveness", "volitional processes", and "virtual control" - for appraising the outworking of the action potentials studied by Libet et. al. is also subject to upstream, causal, physical information qua strong metaphysical determinism.
2. The Neuroscientific Challenge: Libet's Experiments and Pre-conscious Action Initiation
Neuroscientific discoveries have profoundly impacted the free will debate by providing empirical evidence that unconscious brain activity precedes conscious intention. This empirical challenge forms a crucial backdrop for evaluating philosophical accounts of agency, including Pettit's.
2.1 The Readiness Potential (RP) and its Implications
Benjamin Libet's pioneering experiments in the 1980s provided a cornerstone for this debate by empirically investigating the temporal relationship between brain activity and conscious voluntary decision-making (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). Libet measured the Bereitschaftspotential (BP or RP), an electrical signal in the brain that consistently precedes physical action (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). His key finding was that this unconscious brain activity began approximately half a second before subjects reported consciously feeling the urge or intention to move (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006).
This temporal precedence poses a profound challenge to traditional notions of conscious free will. It suggests that decisions might be initiated at an unconscious neural level, with conscious awareness emerging as a retrospective interpretation rather than the direct cause of the action (Libet, 1985; Soon et al., 2008). This perspective leads some neuroscientists and philosophers, such as Sam Harris, to argue that our intuitive belief that intention initiates actions is an "illusion," suggesting that conscious awareness functions more as a "readout" of brain activity already in motion (Harris, 2012).
Further empirical support for this view comes from more recent neuroimaging studies using fMRI. In 2008, scientists demonstrated the ability to predict subjects' simple motor choices (e.g., left or right button press) up to 10 seconds before the subjects became consciously aware of their choice (Soon et al., 2008). More advanced studies have extended this predictive capability to more complex, abstract decisions, such as whether to add or subtract numbers, up to 4 seconds before conscious awareness, indicating that unconscious preparation is not limited to simple motor intentions (Soon et al., 2013). These consistent empirical observations demonstrate a temporal sequence that shifts the causal locus away from conscious will. This profoundly weakens the common-sense notion of free will as originating from conscious deliberation, forcing a re-evaluation of the role of consciousness in action initiation. It suggests that conscious experience might be epiphenomenal in terms of direct causal power over action, fitting more readily into a deterministic framework where conscious states are effects, not uncaused causes.
2.2 The Division of Action Potentials: Body vs. Cognitive Appraisals
Neuroscientific evidence highlights a critical temporal division in the initiation of voluntary action: the body's action potentials, as evidenced by the Readiness Potential (RP), occur significantly earlier than the conscious cognitive processing, including executive functions and prefrontal cortex (PFC) appraisals, related to the intention to act (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006; Soon et al., 2008). While the PFC, particularly the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), is recognized for its crucial role in planning, decision-making, and choosing responses, activity in these areas also precedes conscious intention (Jo et al., 2014; Kondrat, 2025; Schurger et al., 2012). This indicates that even the sophisticated "appraisals" performed by the PFC are part of a pre-conscious neural cascade, rather than an independent, consciously initiated break in the causal chain.
The temporal and functional division observed, where early action potentials precede conscious intention, and even higher-order cognitive activity in the PFC occurs before conscious awareness, strongly implies that "cognitive processing" is not an independent, uncaused initiator of action. Instead, it appears to be a later stage in a sequence of neural events, many of which are unconscious. If the prefrontal activity itself is part of the pre-conscious determination, then the "appraisal" is not a free choice but a determined neural computation, an unfolding of prior physical states. This division, rather than offering a distinct domain for free will, reinforces the argument that conscious cognitive processes are themselves emergent outcomes of prior, often unconscious, neural activity, fitting seamlessly within a strong metaphysical deterministic framework. It suggests that what is perceived as conscious deliberation is merely the conscious experience of a process that has already been set in motion by determined physical causes.
Table 2: Temporal Sequence of Voluntary Action (Based on Libet & Extensions)
| Event | Approximate Timing (relative to action) | Brain Region(s) Involved | Significance for Free Will Debate |
| Early Predictive Brain Activity | Up to 10 seconds before action (fMRI studies) (Soon et al., 2008) | Anterior Frontopolar Cortex (BA 10) (Soon et al., 2013) | Represents the earliest empirical evidence for unconscious pre-determination of choices, long before any conscious awareness. |
| Readiness Potential (RP) Onset | ~2 seconds before action (EEG studies) (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983; Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006) | Supplementary Motor Area (SMA)/pre-SMA, anterior cingulate motor areas (Soon et al., 2013) | The first measurable neural sign of impending movement, indicating brain preparation well in advance of conscious intention. |
| Conscious Urge/Intention (W) | ~200-500 milliseconds before action (Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983) | Not localized to a single region, but rather an emergent conscious experience (Libet, 1985) | Appears after the brain has already begun preparing the action, suggesting it is a "readout" or awareness of an already initiated process, rather than the cause. |
| Point of No Return/Veto Window | ~200 milliseconds before action (Isham et al., 2017) | Implies involvement of prefrontal cortex (PFC) for inhibitory control (Isham et al., 2017; Schurger et al., 2012) | Suggests a limited, time-constrained window for conscious intervention, and raises the question of whether the veto itself is unconsciously determined. |
| Action Execution | 0 milliseconds (time of physical movement) (Libet et al., 1983) | Primary motor cortex, spinal cord, muscles | The observable physical outcome of the preceding neural cascade. |
2.3 The "Free Won't" and its Limitations
In an effort to preserve a role for conscious free will in light of his findings, Benjamin Libet proposed the concept of "free won't". This idea suggests that while unconscious impulses to act may arise, the conscious will retains a limited ability to veto or suppress these actions at the last moment (Libet, 1985).
However, this "free won't" concept faces significant philosophical and empirical challenges. A primary criticism revolves around whether the veto choice itself is truly free or if it too is unconsciously initiated. Research, building on Libet's work, has indicated that even the decision to "veto" an action might be unconsciously determined (Isham et al., 2017; Libet, 1985; Libet et al., 1983; Schurger et al., 2012). Furthermore, studies have identified a "point of no return," approximately 200 milliseconds before movement onset, where a person can still refrain from an action, but only within this very limited, mechanistic window (Isham et al., 2017). Critics also point out that Libet's experiments, dealing with simple, short-time-frame decisions, may not generalize to more complex, thoughtful decisions made over longer periods, where conscious deliberation might play a different role (Mele, 2010; Mele, 2011).
The critical question regarding Libet's "free won't" is whether this veto mechanism itself is an uncaused cause or if it is also a product of prior physical states. If the neural processes underlying the veto are situated within the brain, and the brain is a physically determined system, then the veto, too, must be causally determined. The existence of a "point of no return" indicates a time-constrained, mechanistic window for intervention, rather than an unconstrained, contra-causal ability. This suggests that even the "veto" is a determined response to an initial determined impulse. Therefore, the "free won't" concept, while intuitively appealing as a last bastion of free will, does not fundamentally escape the deterministic challenge if the mechanism for vetoing is itself causally determined. It merely describes a complex, but still determined, inhibitory process within the brain's causal architecture, thus failing to provide a basis for genuine free will against strong metaphysical determinism.
3. Philip Pettit's Agent Control: A Compatibilist Reimagining
Philip Pettit's work offers a sophisticated compatibilist response to the neuroscientific challenges to free will, seeking to redefine agent control in a manner that remains compatible with modern scientific understanding.
3.1 Rejecting the "Act-of-Will" Picture
Pettit explicitly challenges the traditional "act-of-will" picture, a pervasive philosophical assumption that actions are subject to agent-control if and only if they are the products of discrete, instantaneous acts of will (Pettit, 2007). On this traditional view, acts of will are pure, direct manifestations of the mind, capable of being initiated on demand, and are distinct from the actions they prompt (Pettit, 2007). Pettit acknowledges that if this "act-of-will" story were true, then neuroscientific findings like Libet's, which demonstrate unconscious brain activity preceding conscious intention, would indeed establish that agent-control is an illusion (Pettit, 2007). His response is not to deny the scientific findings but to deny the problematic traditional "act-of-will" assumption.
Pettit's rejection of the "act-of-will" picture is a strategic and necessary move for his compatibilist agenda. Instead of attempting to refute the neuroscientific evidence that challenges conscious initiation, he redefines what "control" and "will" entail. This conceptual adjustment allows for a reconciliation with empirical findings, but it does so by redefining agency rather than by demonstrating a departure from causal necessity. This approach, common in compatibilist philosophy (Allan, 2012; Startup, 2021), aims to find a meaningful definition of agency within a causally determined universe, rather than providing a mechanism by which free will could transcend or break that determinism.
3.2 Redefining Agent Control: Reasons-Responsiveness and Virtual Control
Pettit proposes an alternative conception of agent control that he argues is compatible with the best interpretation of scientific results (Pettit, 2007; Pettit et al., 2016). This alternative moves away from the requirement of prior conscious awareness for control. A cornerstone of his view is "reasons-responsiveness," meaning an agent's actions are appropriately related to their beliefs and desires, even if the agent is not deliberatively aware of those reasons prior to acting (Pettit et al., 2016). This challenges the simplistic notion that moral responsibility only applies when one acts on consciously articulated reasons (Pettit et al., 2016).
Pettit further introduces the concept of "virtual control," where an agent is considered reasons-responsive if reason (or the agent's cognitive system) monitors automatic decisions and intervenes only when something goes wrong (Pettit et al., 2016). This account explicitly accommodates the pervasive automaticity and influences escaping deliberative awareness highlighted by behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences (Pettit et al., 2016).
Pettit's concepts of "reasons-responsiveness" and "virtual control" fundamentally shift the locus of agency from an instantaneous, consciously willed act to a continuous, systemic property of the agent's cognitive architecture. This aligns with the idea that decision-making is "distributed across different brain processes" (Pettit et al., 2016). By focusing on the system's capacity to monitor and correct, Pettit describes a form of control that does not necessarily require conscious intervention at the point of initiation. However, this system-level control, while robust, does not inherently introduce indeterminism. The "monitoring" and "intervention" mechanisms themselves could be the product of complex, yet deterministic, neural computations and information processing. While Pettit successfully offers a definition of agency that is compatible with the observed automaticity and distributed nature of brain function, this compatibility is achieved by describing a form of control that is itself potentially fully determined by underlying physical processes. This means his account describes how a determined system can exhibit sophisticated behavior that we label "control," rather than why it is not determined.
3.3 Volition as a Process, Not an Instantaneous Event
Pettit proposes that volition should be viewed as a consequence of being a certain type of agent, rather than an instantaneous act (Pettit, 2007). This implies that conscious state alone does not guarantee voluntary action, but rather a continuity of processes under conscious attentional control (Pettit et al., 2016). This sophisticated view allows for moral responsibility to be assigned even when individuals are not deliberatively aware of all the reasons for their actions, moving beyond simplistic notions of prior conscious awareness as a sole determinant of agency (Pettit et al., 2016).
By conceptualizing volition as a "process" and accommodating the role of automaticity (Pettit et al., 2016), Pettit attempts to reconcile our subjective experience of agency with the neuroscientific evidence of unconscious processes. This is a key compatibilist strategy (Allan, 2012; Startup, 2021) aimed at preserving a meaningful sense of agency and moral responsibility within a causally determined world. The "continuity of processes under conscious attentional control" (Pettit et al., 2016) still leaves open the crucial question of whether this "attentional control" itself is a determined outcome of prior physical states. Pettit's framework successfully offers a definition of agency that is compatible with many neuroscientific findings and common conceptions of responsibility. However, this compatibility is achieved by reinterpreting agency to fit within a deterministic reality, rather than by disproving or blocking the underlying strong metaphysical determinism. It describes the how of agency in a determined world, not the why of its freedom from determination.
4. The Pervasive Reach of Strong Metaphysical Determinism: Undermining Cognitive Control
The core challenge to Pettit's account, from the perspective of strong metaphysical determinism, lies in the pervasive causal nature of the physical universe, which extends to all brain processes, including those underlying cognitive control.
4.1 The Causal Closure of the Physical: A Fundamental Principle
A cornerstone of physicalism and a significant challenge to non-deterministic free will is the principle of causal closure of the physical (CCP). This principle asserts that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause within the physical domain, meaning that causal chains do not exit or enter the physical realm from a non-physical one (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Wulf & Isham, 2025).
The implication of CCP is profound: to avoid systematic overdetermination (where a physical effect has both a sufficient physical cause and a distinct mental cause), mental events must ultimately be identical to physical events if they are to have physical effects (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Wulf & Isham, 2025). This aligns with the physicalist view that the mind is brain activity, or at least supervenes upon it (Churchland, 2007).
The principle of causal closure establishes an ontological reality where all physical effects, including those within the brain, are fully accounted for by prior physical causes. This implies an unbroken causal chain that originates at the microphysical level and propagates upwards through the brain's organizational hierarchy. This principle directly undermines any notion of free will that requires an uncaused cause, a non-physical intervention, or a break in the physical causal chain. It asserts that the physical realm is causally complete unto itself, leaving no room for an independent, non-physical will to initiate action.
4.2 Cognitive Processing as Physical Information Processing
Executive functions and prefrontal cortex (PFC) appraisals, which are central to Pettit's account of agent control, are understood as sophisticated forms of physically realized information processing within the brain (Horst, 2015; Schurger et al., 2012; Soon et al., 2013). These cognitive operations, like all brain activity, involve the electrochemical interactions of neurons and their constituent microphysical particles. Crucially, these processes, as physical events, are causally determined by the prior total set of contributing microphysical information states in the brain and its environment (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Startup, 2021; Jin, 2023; Wheelock & Long, 2024). This means that the "information" being processed, and the "processing" itself, are reducible to and necessitated by the preceding microphysical configuration of the brain.
This perspective aligns with the reductionist view that consciousness and brain function are explainable as a "machinelike" system (American Scientist, 2025). Proponents of this view, such as Francis Crick, assert that mental activities—including joys, sorrows, memories, ambitions, and even the sense of free will—are "no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells, glial cells, and the atoms, ions, and molecules that make them up" (Crick, as cited in Parker, 2015). Neural firing precedes awareness, and the brain's operations are fundamentally governed by physical laws (American Scientist, 2025; Startup, 2021).
If executive functions and PFC appraisals are indeed physically realized information processing, then they are subject to the same causal laws that govern all physical systems. Brain states, and by extension mental states, are determined by prior microphysical states (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Startup, 2021; Wheelock & Long, 2024). This means that the complex "appraisals," "decisions," and "choices" made by these brain regions are not freely willed in a contra-causal sense, but are the necessary outcomes of the preceding microphysical configuration of the brain and its environmental inputs. The "machinelike" nature of the brain implies that its operations, however complex, are governed by deterministic principles. This directly refutes the idea that cognitive processing offers a loophole for free will. Instead, it demonstrates that these sophisticated processes are themselves an integral part of the deterministic causal chain, merely representing higher-level manifestations of underlying determined physical events.
4.3 Naturalistic Determinism Applied
My informational, naturalistic determinism directly supports this argument. Human cognition and behavior are entirely the result of environmental and individual causes that are in-principle knowable (Long, 2023a; Long, 2023b). From this perspective, introducing an "indeterminable source" like contra-causal free will would only diminish our capacity for accurate prediction and understanding of human agents (Long, 2023a). Humans may well be physico-informationally "fully caused" and not "causal exceptions to nature" (Long, 2023b). This means that any perceived "control" or "agency" must be understood as emerging from and operating within the confines of these pervasive physico-informational, causal laws, rather than transcending them.
Such physicalist and physico-informational naturalism is fundamentally incompatible with the notion of an "uncaused cause" or any form of contra-causal free will. If human cognition and behavior are "fully caused" by environmental and individual factors (Long, 2023b), and if physical information processing in the brain is determined by prior microphysical states, then there is no logical space for an "indeterminable source" (Long, 2023a) within the brain that could initiate action outside this causal chain. This means that even Pettit's sophisticated "agent control" must be interpreted as a manifestation of these underlying determined processes, not a transcendence of them. Informational naturalistic determinism provides the crucial philosophical underpinning for why Pettit's compatibilist redefinition of agency, while potentially valuable for other purposes (e.g., moral responsibility within a deterministic framework), cannot logically block strong metaphysical determinism. It asserts that the very fabric of reality, including the human mind, is physico-informationally, causally necessitated.
5. Why Pettit's Argument Doesn't Block Strong Metaphysical Determinism
While Philip Pettit's account of agent control offers a compelling and nuanced compatibilist framework, it ultimately describes a form of agency that is compatible with, and indeed emergent from, a fully determined physical system, rather than one that genuinely blocks strong metaphysical determinism.
5.1 The Illusion of Control within a Determined System
Pettit's concepts of "reasons-responsiveness" and "virtual control" provide a sophisticated description of how complex agents function; however, they do not introduce genuine indeterminism into the system. Instead, this sophisticated form of agency is itself a determined outcome of prior physical states and causal laws (Pettit et al., 2016; Startup, 2021). The "control" Pettit describes is a manifestation of complex, but ultimately deterministic, underlying neural processes, rather than a break from the causal chain (Startup, 2021). The brain's ability to "weigh alternatives" or "monitor" for errors is a sophisticated computational capacity, but it remains a computation governed by physical laws. Sam Harris's perspective that free will "describes what it feels like to identify with certain mental states as they arise in consciousness" further supports the idea that the subjective experience of control is an outcome of brain processes, not an independent cause (Harris, 2012).
Pettit's sophisticated compatibilism aims to preserve agency by redefining "control" to be compatible with neuroscientific findings (Pettit et al., 2016). However, if the underlying physical reality is one of strong metaphysical determinism (Chen, 2020a; Penrose, 1989), then the very mechanisms that constitute Pettit's "agent control"—such as reasons-responsiveness, monitoring, and intervention—are themselves complex, yet causally necessitated, brain processes. This means that the "control" described is a property of a determined system, not a property that breaks the system's determination. It is a description of how a highly complex, determined machine operates, rather than an argument for its fundamental freedom from causal laws. Pettit's account provides a valuable framework for understanding how complex agents function in a determined world and why we attribute responsibility. However, it does not provide a mechanism for genuine free will that blocks the deterministic nature of that world; rather, it reinterprets free will as a feature within a deterministic reality.
Table 3: Pettit's Agent Control vs. Strong Metaphysical Determinism: A Causal Analysis
| Aspect of Pettit's Agent Control | Description | Analysis under Strong Metaphysical Determinism | Implication for Free Will |
| Rejection of "Act-of-Will" | Pettit argues against the traditional view of an instantaneous, conscious, originating act of will as the source of action (Pettit, 2007). | This rejection aligns with neuroscientific findings (e.g., Libet's RP) that show unconscious initiation (Libet, 1985; Soon et al., 2008). It does not introduce indeterminism, but rather refines the concept of agency to fit observed brain function. | Does not provide a basis for contra-causal free will; merely shifts the definition of agency to be compatible with pre-conscious processes. |
| Reasons-Responsiveness | An agent's actions are appropriately related to their beliefs and desires, even if those reasons are not consciously deliberated prior to action (Pettit et al., 2016). | The formation of beliefs, desires, and the neural mechanisms for responding to them are themselves products of deterministic brain processes and environmental influences (Startup, 2021). The "responsiveness" is a complex, but determined, output of the system. | The "responsiveness" is a manifestation of determined processes, not a source of genuine, undetermined choice. |
| Virtual Control | Reason (or the cognitive system) monitors automatic decisions and intervenes only when something goes wrong, acting as a "monitor-and-intervene" mechanism (Pettit et al., 2016). | The "monitoring" and "intervention" mechanisms (e.g., PFC activity) are physically realized computations, causally determined by prior microphysical states (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Startup, 2021). The criteria for "something going wrong" and the corrective response are also determined. | This form of control is a sophisticated, but still determined, feedback loop within the brain's physical architecture. |
| Volition as Process | Volition is viewed as a continuous process generated by a certain type of agent, rather than an instantaneous, singular event (Pettit, 2007). | The entire "process" of volition, from its unconscious initiation (RP) to conscious appraisal and potential "veto," is a sequence of physically determined events (Libet, 1985; Soon et al., 2008; Startup, 2021). There is no point in the process where an uncaused event occurs. | The "process" is a determined unfolding of neural states, not a source of genuine, undetermined freedom. |
| Conscious Appraisal (PFC/Executive) | The cognitive evaluation of action potentials and decision-making, involving executive functions and the prefrontal cortex. | These appraisals are physical information processing events in the brain, subject to causation by the prior total set of contributing microphysical information states in the brain and environment (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Startup, 2021; Wheelock & Long, 2024). The content and timing of conscious awareness are determined. | The conscious experience itself, and its role in "appraisal," is a determined outcome, not an independent causal force capable of breaking the deterministic chain. |
5.2 Libet's Findings Re-evaluated under Strong Determinism
The temporal gap revealed by Libet's experiments, where unconscious brain activity (RP) precedes conscious intention, does not introduce indeterminism if both the early unconscious brain activity and the subsequent conscious cognitive appraisal (including PFC activity) are physically determined (Libet, 1985; Soon et al., 2008; Startup, 2021). The "division" between pre-conscious and conscious processes is not a metaphysical divide between determined and undetermined events, but rather a temporal sequence of physically determined events occurring at different levels of neural processing and awareness (Startup, 2021).
Libet's findings are often misconstrued as introducing indeterminism or a "gap" for free will. However, under strong metaphysical determinism, this temporal gap is simply a sequence of determined physical events. The unconscious RP is determined by prior microphysical states, and the subsequent conscious intention and cognitive appraisal (including PFC activity) are also determined by their own prior microphysical states (Startup, 2021). Thus, consciousness, while a real phenomenon, is causally downstream from the initiation of action and is itself a determined outcome of brain processes. This re-evaluation reinforces the argument that conscious experience, while subjectively compelling, is epiphenomenal in terms of initiating action in a way that could break the deterministic chain. It is a product of the determined brain, not an independent causal force.
5.3 The Inescapable Causal Chain
Ultimately, any "choice," "appraisal," "reasons-responsiveness," or "virtual control" attributed to the prefrontal cortex or other cognitive functions is the inevitable consequence of prior microphysical states in the brain and its environment (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Startup, 2021; Wheelock & Long, 2024). This causal chain extends indefinitely backward in time, meaning that the ultimate causes of our actions lie beyond our control, originating in conditions that existed long before our birth and the immutable laws of nature (Startup, 2021). From a strong metaphysical determinist perspective, there is no point in this chain—from the microphysical interactions of particles to the macro-level cognitive processes—where an "uncaused cause" or a genuinely free choice (in the incompatibilist sense) can intervene to alter the predetermined course of events.
The core of strong metaphysical determinism (Chen, 2020a; Penrose, 1989) is that the entire history of the universe is fixed. This implies that the current state of the brain, including all its complex cognitive functions and the "information processing" it performs (as described by Pettit's agent control), is a necessary outcome of the prior total set of microphysical states (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Startup, 2021; Wheelock & Long, 2024). Therefore, even if Pettit's "agent control" describes a sophisticated mechanism for navigating the world, this mechanism itself is a determined physical process. There is no logical or empirical space in the causal chain, from the fundamental microphysical level to the emergent macro-cognitive level, where an "uncaused cause" or a genuinely free choice (in the incompatibilist sense) can intervene. Any "choice" is merely the determined output of a determined system. This forms the ultimate barrier to Pettit's account blocking strong metaphysical determinism. His framework, while valuable for understanding agency within a deterministic system, cannot provide a basis for free will that transcends or disproves the fundamental causal necessity governing all physical reality, including the brain.
6. Conclusion: Agency Without Contra-Causal Free Will
In conclusion, Philip Pettit's "Neuroscience and Agent Control" offers a valuable and nuanced compatibilist framework for understanding human agency and moral responsibility in light of neuroscientific discoveries (Pettit, 2007; Pettit et al., 2016). His redefinition of agent control, emphasizing reasons-responsiveness and virtual control, successfully accommodates the empirical findings of unconscious action initiation and the distributed nature of decision-making.
However, a thorough analysis reveals that Pettit's account does not, and fundamentally cannot, provide a basis for free will that blocks the implications of strong metaphysical determinism. The very mechanisms of control and reasons-responsiveness he describes, including complex cognitive processing in executive functions and the prefrontal cortex, are themselves physically realized information processing events. These events are causally determined by the prior total set of contributing microphysical information states in the brain and environment (Andersen, 2016; Kim, 2009; Startup, 2021; Wheelock & Long, 2024).
This conclusion is strongly supported by my physico-informational, naturalistic perspective, which posits that human behavior, including all complex cognitive processes, is "fully caused" and operates entirely within the causal laws (including information processing) of nature (Long, 2023a; Long, 2023b). From this viewpoint, the notion of a "contra-causal" or "uncaused" free will is a metaphysical assumption that lacks empirical support and, indeed, diminishes our explanatory power regarding human agents (Long, 2023a).
Therefore, the temporal precedence of unconscious brain activity (Libet's RP) over conscious intention, coupled with the pervasive causal closure of the informational-physical realm, implies that the conscious experience of willing or controlling is an emergent property of a determined system. As Sam Harris contends, the "illusion of free will is itself an illusion", as our subjective experience of willing is a determined outcome of our brain's intricate operations (Harris, 2012).
Ultimately, a robust understanding of human agency, accountability, and even moral responsibility can exist within a fully determined universe, without resorting to the metaphysical notion of an uncaused will (Allan, 2012; Long, 2023a; Long, 2023b; Jin, 2023). Embracing this naturalistic determinism can lead to a more compassionate and scientifically grounded view of human behavior and societal structures, moving beyond antiquated notions of ultimate responsibility based on a contra-causal free will (Long, 2023b).
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